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1. Introduction 
  The concept of output gaps is widely used and seen essential particularly in monetary 
economics.
1 The output gap is defined as the difference between potential and actual output, 
and empirically is often estimated by the difference between trend and actual GDP. In many 
empirical works, estimates of output gaps often show relatively long duration of continuously 
deviated periods, namely for several years.
2 Recent empirical works such like Haltmaier 
(2001), Mc Morrow and Roeger (2001), Kamada and Masuda (2000), and Scott (2000) all 
indicate the possibility of relatively long duration of output gaps as well as many of past 
empirical researches.   
  There are basically two completely different views about output gaps.
3 One view stresses 
importance of rigidities or frictions in one or more markets, which delay adjustments 
particularly of prices or wages. The other view is represented by the early version of real 
business cycle models and asserts that, because most of shocks are productivity shocks, 
fluctuations of GDP are basically identical with fluctuations of potential GDP and thus 
estimated deviations of actual GDP from its trend should not be interpreted as output gaps. 
  The objective of the paper is to pursue a new completely different view such that even if 
there is no rigidity, protracted output gaps are theoretically possible. One reason to pursue the 
third possibility is a puzzle on the recent development of the Japanese economy. The Japanese 
economy has been mired in a persisting slump lasing over 10 years since 1990s, during which, 
continuing deflation, continuously rising unemployment rate and persisting low utilization of 
                                                   
1  See e.g. Svensson (1999).   
2 Although the definition of output gap is very clear, its estimation is very difficult mainly because it is hard to 
estimate the true potential output. Hence currently used several estimation methods generate very different estimates 
and leave wide room for different interpretations.   
3  See e.g. European Central Bank (2000).   2
capital have been observed.
4 These phenomena strongly suggest that the output has been far 
lower than its potential for long period, that is, there has been a protracted large output gap.
5 
This over 10 years protracted large deviation from trend does not seem to be explained easily 
by some rigidities since the view based on rigidities assumes that a large deviation continues 
merely for a short period, namely a few years after a shock.   
  Without relying on rigidities, what kind of economic forces can generate protracted large 
output gaps?
6 The paper uncovers a new possibility that when a fundamental shock hits an 
economy, consumers do not proceed on the optimal path of the representative consumer during 
the transition to the new steady state, as a result of fully rational calculation. Proceeding on the 
deviated transition path from the optimal path of the representative consumer directly means 
protracted large output gap.   
    The driving force behind this strange phenomenon is non-cooperative consumers’ behavior. 
When a fundamental shock fits an economy, all the agents are flown out of the optimal path 
they have proceeded. At that moment, each consumer must decide which direction to proceed 
hereafter. The new path is not naturally deterministic but is decided strategically based on the 
expected utility calculated considering other consumers’ choices. Each consumer behaves for 
her own interest non-cooperatively considering the other consumers’ strategies. One choice is 
to jump to the new saddle path of the representative consumer, however, it is not clear that the 
                                                   
4  There are several estimates of the output gap in Japan. See e.g. Kamada and Masuda (2000) or Haltmaier (2001).   
5 According to the reduced form Phillips curve, continuing deflation is a result of either monetary policies or a 
protracted large output gap. Since nominal short-term interest rate was nearly zero since mid-90s in Japan, 
theoretically it may be hard to blame only monetary policy as the cause of continuing deflation. If the monetary 
policy has had little influence on deflation in Japan, a continuing large output gap would be the only factor that 
makes deflation persist in Japan.   
6 One simple possibility is that an economy unfortunately faced several negative shocks consecutively over 10 
years. This explanation implies that a long persisting slump of the economy is simply a result of “unlucky.” 
However, the occurrence of consecutive negative shocks in over 10 years may be too rare to be believed a priori.   3
path is also optimal for each consumer, since each consumer is not sure whether the other 
consumers will jump to that path or not. Each consumer needs to calculate her expected utility 
and judge whether a jump to the new optimal path of the representative consumer is also 
optimal for her or not. 
  For example, consider the case of an upward time preference shift depicted in Figure 1. To 
come back to the optimal path of the representative consumer, consumers must jump up their 
consumption at the time of the shock from the point of the old steady state to the point Z and 
afterwards they must gradually reduce their consumption to the much lower new steady state 
consumption. This zigzag course of the optimal path of the representative consumer appears 
intuitively unnatural. In actuality consumers may reduce their consumption from the old steady 
state to the new steady state straightly. Intuitively it is expected that all the consumers will 
chose the strategy of straight reduction of their consumption, but there remains a question 
whether this deviation from the optimal path of the representative consumer is optimal for each 
consumer. One of the motifs of the paper is to probe this question that may be answered 
intuitively yes but be thought theoretically problematic.     
  The paper shows that if the prior probability of deviation of most consumers when a shock 
hits an economy exceeds some critical point, all the consumers expect that the deviation gives 
them higher expected utilities and then they deviate. The reason why the expected utility of a 
consumer who tries to deviate is higher in case that most of the consumers are expected to 
deviate is that deviated consumers can reach the new steady state in a finite period. 
  The new possibility of output gaps in the paper has two important advantages; 1) it is not 
necessary to present a micro foundation for a difficult question why price adjustments are far 
slower than quantity adjustments,
7 and 2) it is not necessary to solely depend on productivity 
shocks as the early version of real business cycles model that has well-known shortcomings 
such as the weak internal-propagation mechanism that needs large and persisting productivity 
                                                   
7  As for criticisms to the new Keynesian theory, see e.g. Mankiw (2000).   4
shocks or necessity of unimaginably frequent negative productivity shocks.
8  
  The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, it is proved that there is a possibility that 
deviated transition paths that are different from the optimal path for the representative 
consumer are rationally chosen. Then the relation between the scale of shocks and deviated 
transition paths, as well as the characteristics of the optimal deviated transition path, is 
examined. In section 3, some concluding remarks are offered in section 3. 
 
2. A Mechanism of Protracted Output Gaps in a Smooth Environment 
  2.1 An intuitive explanation of output gaps in an economy without any rigidity 
  If consumers are cooperative, they will proceed on the optimal path of the representative 
consumer and will not deviate from the path. However, it cannot be imagined that all the 
consumers are coordinated to behave as a person. Each consumer behaves for her own interest 
considering the other consumers’ strategies. If consumers are non-cooperative, the story will 
not be so simple. The optimal choice of consumption for a consumer cannot be determined by 
only her own independent intention but will change according to the other consumers' choices. 
Each consumer must act strategically. If a consumer calculates that the expected utility when 
she deviated from the optimal path of the representative consumer is higher than that when she 
proceeds on the optimal path, she will deviate. 
    If most of the consumers are on the optimal path of the representative consumer, the number 
of consumers who dare to deviate will be expected to be small. In this situation, the expected 
utility of the consumer who tries to deviate may be smaller than that when she proceeds on the 
optimal path. Hence, all the consumers will proceed on the optimal path of the representative 
consumer even though they are non-cooperative.   
    However, consider a situation that a fundamental shock hits an economy and its steady state 
is changed. At the time of the shock, all the consumers are flown out of the optimal path they 
                                                   
8  As for criticisms to real business cycle models, see e.g. King and Rebelo (2000) or Gali (1999).   5
have proceeded and must decide the direction in which to proceed hereafter while wandering 
far from the new optimal path of the representative consumer. A jump of consumption to the 
new saddle path is the new optimal path for the representative consumer. Nevertheless, this 
path is not naturally the new optimal path for each non-cooperative consumer. Each 
consumer’s new paths will not be determined only by her own independent intention but will 
change according to the choices of other consumers. Consumers must act strategically. Since 
all the consumers are not on the optimal path just after the shock, the number of consumers 
who dare to deviate will be much larger compared with that when they are all on the optimal 
path. It can be shown that if the prior expected probability of deviation of other consumers 
exceeds a critical point, the expected utility of a consumer who tries to deviate is higher than 
that when she does not deviate. The same calculation will be done by other consumers, thus all 
the consumers expect that their expected utilities are higher when they deviate than when they 
do not deviate. Facing these calculations of consumers, firms expect that most consumers will 
deviate and thus firms’ capital must be adjusted corresponding to the deviation of 
consumers─that is, unused excessive capital must be destroyed. As a result, all the consumers 
and firms expect that all the consumers and firms deviate from the optimal path of the 
representative consumers, and they behave based on this expectation and therefore in actually 
they  deviate.   
  The reason why the expected utility of a consumer who dares to deviate is higher in case 
that many of the consumers are expected to deviate is that deviated consumers can reach the 
new steady state in a finite period. The saddle path of the representative consumer approaches 
the new steady state as the limit of its consumption steam but never reach the steady state. This 
difference-whether consumers reach the steady state in a finite period or not- is the most 
crucial factor for the deviation. Imagine that all the consumers deviate and reach the new 
steady state in a finite period although capital is not adjusted fully yet and thus is excessive. It 
may be intuitively agreed that the most probable way for firms is to merely destroy the   6
excessive capital that generates merely maintenance costs. If there is a possibility of partial 
destruction of capital, the optimal path of the representative consumer is not naturally the 
optimal path for each consumer anymore.     
 
  2.2 The basic framework 
  (1)  The  model 
    It is assumed that all the households (consumers) are identical and infinitely living, and each 
of them maximizes the expected utility 
   () ( ) dt c u θ E t
t ∫
∞ − +
0 1 ,                                                    ( 1 )  
where E is the expectations operator, ct is consumption per capita at time t, u(·) is utility 
function, and θ ( > 0) is the rate of time preference.
9 It is assumed that  0 > ′ u ,  0 < ′ ′ u , 
() ∞ = ′ 0 u . The representative firm is assumed to have a production function of  () k f y = , 
where k is labor-capital ratio and is described on a per-capita basis. Technological progress and 
depreciation of capital are not assumed. Given that ( ) 0 0 = f , ( ) 0 > ′ k f , () 0 < ′ ′ k f , 
() ∞ = ′ 0 f ,  () 0 = ∞ ′ f  and labor supply increases at a constant rate of n, the growth rate 
of k is: 
   () t t t
t nk c k f
dt
dk
− − = .                                                ( 2 )  
ct and kt are continuous and differentiable, and u and f are continuous functions. It is assumed 
that n = 0. 
  The rational expectation is assumed, and markets are complete and neither rigidity nor 
productivity shock exists in the model. Hence, the economy is perfectly smoothly adjusted 
after shocks.   
 
                                                   
9  θ is assumed to be small as usually supposed and thus approximately ln(1+θ) = θ.   7
  (2)  Shocks  
  Any fundamental shock that moves the existing steady state may cause deviated transition 
paths. However, in the paper particularly a shock on time preference is examined. The reason 
why this shock is chosen is that by using this shock it is easy to explain the mechanism of 
deviation because of a unique nature of the shock such that when an upward time preference 
shock occurs, consumption must jump up to restore equilibrium although consumption at the 
new steady state must be much lower than that before the shock. The effects of an upward time 
preference shift are depicted in Figure 1. When an economy is at the steady state and then an 
upward shift of time preference rate that moves the vertical line  0 =
dt
dc t  to a lower 
labor-capital ratio occurs, the consumption of the representative consumer needs to jump 
immediately from the old steady state to the point Z in order to restore equilibrium, and then 
proceeds on the new saddle path to the much lower new steady state. This zigzag course of the 
optimal path of the representative consumer appears unnatural intuitively, and in actuality 
consumers may reduce their consumption from the old steady state to the new steady state 
straightly. 
    Since the era of Böhm-Bawerk (1889) and Fisher (1930), time preference has been naturally 
supposed and observed to be time-variable although the rate of time preference in many 
economic analyses has been assumed to be constant for the purpose of simplicity and 
tractability since Samuelson (1937). Time-variable time preference is not merely a theoretical 
possibility. Parkin (1988), e.g., showed that the rate of time preference was as volatile as the 
technology and leisure preferences in the U.S. Uzawa (1968) presents the well known 
endogenous time preference model and Harashima (2004) extends it to a model that has a more 
realistic mechanism of endogenously changing time preference rate.
10  
                                                   
10 Harashima (2004) shows a possibility that the protracted slump in Japan was caused by an 2 % upward time 
preference shift.   8
  For simplicity, I concentrate on the case of the upward time preference shift in the paper. 
The same argument can be applied for the case of the downward time preference shift.
11 
 
 (3)  Assumptions 
  If a deviated consumption path is chosen rationally, it must be a result of judging by 
individual consumers that the expected utility in the case of deviation is higher than that in the 
case of non-deviation. Hence it is necessary to compare the expected utilities in both cases to 
verify the possibility of a deviation. To simplify this comparison, it is assumed that there are 
two options concerning the jump of consumption in a situation that the rate of time preference 
shifts upward when all the consumers have been at the steady state. One is “J” where 
consumption of a consumer abruptly jumps to the new saddle path of the representative 
consumer and then the consumer proceeds on the new saddle path. The other is “NJ”, where 
consumption of a consumer does not jump to the new saddle path of the representative 
consumer and then the consumer gradually reduces her consumption from the level at the old 
steady state to that at the new one. Those are illustrated in Figure 1. If “J”, that is “jump” of 
consumption, is chosen, when the rate of time preference rises, consumption immediately 
jumps to point Z and after that the consumer proceeds on the new saddle path of the 
representative consumer. On the other hand, if “NJ”, that is the “non-jump”, is chosen, the 
consumer does not jump to Z but directly approaches the new steady state proceeding on the 
bold dashed line. The difference in consumption between the two options in each period t is bt 
(> 0). Hence b0 is difference of consumption between Z and the old steady state. It is assumed 
                                                   
11  In the case of the downward time preference shift, if consumption does not jump, capital accumulation becomes 
somewhat difficult, which means that, for example, some kind of hoarding may be necessary. However, the effect of 
hoarding may be limited, and economic expansion will be restrained by its limitation. Hence, the business cycle 
may have an asymmetric feature between recovery and recession, that is, relatively slow progress during recovery in 
response to a downward time preference shift and a relatively sharp decrease during recession in response to an 
upward time preference shift.   9
that  bt diminishes gradually and continuously and at time s  bt becomes zero, that is, any 
consumer choosing NJ makes a very small jump to the new steady state consumption. 
 
Assumptions:     
₁ A1腪The deviated transition path of consumption  t c after an upward shift of time 
preference rate – that is NJ – is continuous and differentiable and  0 <
dt
dct  if  s t < ≤ 0 . 
   ( A 2 )   t t c c c ˆ < < if  s t < ≤ 0  and  c ct = if  t s≤ , where  t c ˆ  is the consumption on the new 
saddle path of the representative consumer andc is the new steady state consumption. 
₁ A3腪 0 ˆ > − = t t t c c b  if  s t < ≤ 0  and  0 = t b  if  t s≤ . 
 
  It should be noted that deviation bt in the case of NJ does not simply mean the existence of 
continuous disequilibrium. bt that was generated in period t will be eliminated quickly, for 
example, in a few quarters, by namely simply destroying excess capital by firms, and 
equilibrium will be recovered.
12 However, in the next period t + 1, a similar deviation from 
equilibrium  bt+1 will occur since agents are not on the saddle path of the representative 
consumer. That is, each bt does not mean the existence of a continuous disequilibrium but 
means successive generation of the same kind of temporary deviation from equilibrium and its 
successive elimination. Hence, the economy may be regarded basically as situating at 
equilibrium. However, successive deviations from equilibrium may make it appear as if there 
exists a continuous disequilibrium.   
  The paper examines a situation that consumers are not cooperative. For the convenience of 
analysis, it is assumed that, when a consumer chooses an option that is different from those of 
the other consumers, the difference of capital accumulation resulting from difference of 
                                                   
12  Destroying capital may be achieved in practice by bankruptcy, renouncing credit and so on.   10
consumption bt before time s between the consumer’s and the other consumers’ consumptions 
is reflected in the consumption after time s. That is, the return to this difference of capital 
accumulation (interest rate times difference of capital accumulation) a (> 0) is added to (or 
subtracted from) her consumption in each period after the time s.
13 
    The expected utility is given in this situation by combining the cases of acting alone (Jalone: 
jumping alone or NJalone: non-jumping alone) and acting together (Jtogether: jumping 
together with other consumers or NJtogether: non-jumping together with other consumers). 
Jalone means that a consumer’s consumption jumps while the other consumers’ do not, and 
NJalone means that a consumer’s consumption does not jump while the other consumers’ do. 
Jtogether means that all consumers’ consumptions jump in the same way, and NJtogether 
means none of the consumptions jump. 
  W i t h  p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) that is subjective probability that the other consumers jump, expected 
utilities in cases of J and NJ are respectively, E(J) = pE(Jtogether) + (1 - p)E(Jalone) and 
E(NJ) = pE(NJalone) + (1 - p)E(NJtogether). Figure 2 shows an image of a deviated transition 
path. 
    In this situation, capital is assumed to be adjusted as follows. 
 
Assumptions:  
  (A4) Firms adjust their capital to the new steady state level at s, if it is expected that p = 0 
for most of the consumers.   
  (A5)  If  E(J) - E(NJ) < 0 for a consumer, E(J) - E(NJ) < 0 for all the consumers and thus p = 
                                                   
13 This assumption means that, if a consumer chooses non-jump while the others choose jump, she accumulates 
more savings than the others’, and after time s, instead of choosing to consume it at once, she chooses to receive 
interest income from this extra saving and consumes the interest during each subsequent period. Also if a consumer 
chooses jump alone, her consumption is assumed to be smaller by at each period after time s in each subsequent 
period since her savings are smaller than the others.   11
0 for all the consumers. On the other hand If E(J) - E(NJ) > 0 for a consumer, E(J) - E(NJ) > 0 
for all the consumers and thus p = 1 for all the consumers. 
   
  The assumption (A4) means that if all the consumers take a choice of non-jump, firms 
behave based on the expected realization of deviation of consumers, thus the expected 
excessive capital that is the difference between the existing capital and the new steady state 
capital is adjusted at s. Destroying the excessive capital is rational for firms because although 
all the consumers are at the new steady state at s, if firms continue to possess capital that is 
perfectly expected to be unnecessary, it will merely cost them. 
  The assumption (A5) indicates that a consumer expects that all the consumers expect their 
utility in the same manner. As a whole these two assumptions do not appear to be unnatural.   
    Then, the expected utility in case of J and NJ are respectively 
  E(J) = pE(Jtogether)+(1 - p)E(Jalone) 
() ( ) () ( )  

 





t dt c u θ dt b c u θ pE ˆ 1 1
0
() () ( ) () ()  

 
 − + + + + − + ∫∫




t dt a c u θ dt b c u θ E p
0 1 1 1 ,                         ( 3 )  
and 
  E(NJ) = pE(NJalone)+(1 - p)E(NJtogether) 
() ( ) () ( )  

 
 + + + + = ∫∫




t dt a c u θ dt c u θ pE
0 ˆ 1 1
() () ( ) () ()  

 





t dt c u θ dt c u θ E p 1 1 1
0
,                           ( 4 )  
where 
() ∫∫ + =
ss
r q r dr dq i b θ a
0 1 ln exp ,                                        ( 5 )  
and  
() ∫∫ + =
ss
r q r t t dr dq i b i a
0 1 ln exp                                        ( 6 )  
and  c is consumption at the new steady state, it is interest rate and E(Jtogether), E(Jalone),   12
E(NJalone) and E(NJtogether) are the expected utilities in case of Jtogether, Jalone, NJalone 
and NJtogether respectively.
14 If the other consumers are expected to jump (this is the case 
of p ) capital will not be adjusted at period s, thus consumption after s is t c ˆ . On the other hand 
if the other consumers are not expected to jump (this is the case of p − 1 ) capital will be 
adjusted at period s, thus consumption after s is  c .  
  In equation (3) consumption after s in the case of Jalone is a c − . This is because in the 
case of Jalone, the other consumers’ aggregated bt is destroyed and this destruction of 
capital─that is invested savings by consumers─is allocated equally to each consumer’s savings 
including Jalone consumer’s since destruction of capital is decided not by consumers but by 
firms. Hence, the Jalone consumer’s savings is reduced by the same ratio as the other 
consumers, which results in the reduction of consumption of the Jalone consumer bya after s. 
Since the economy is basically at equilibrium, the interest rate equals the marginal productivity. 
If the other consumers are not expected to jump (this is the case of p − 1 ), after s, ct, it and at 
are constant and is equals θ because the economy is at the new steady state where the marginal 
productivity is identical to the time preference. The interest rate iq during transition changes 
from the old rate of time preference to the new one.   
 
Assumptions:     
   ( A 6 )   () t t
t c k f
dt
dk ˆ − = if  s t < , and  k kt =  if  t s ≤ where  k is the new steady state 
capital-labor ratio. 
   ( A 7 ) () t t k f i ′ = . Therefore  θ i θ t < ≤ 1  if  s t < ≤ 0  and  θ it =  if  t s≤  where  1 θ  
is the old rate of time preference andθ  is the new rate of time preference.   
                                                   
14 The equations (5) and (6) mean that the value of the added (or subtracted) saving by br will increase by 
compound interest between the time r to s.   13
   ( A 8 )   t k and thus t i are continuous and differentiable if  s t < ≤ 0 . 
 
    The assumption (A6) means that unused resources bt are eliminated by destruction of capital 
in each period, therefore capital is adjusted in each period by ( )( ) t t t t t b c k f c k f − − = − ˆ .  
    To analyze the mechanism of deviated transition path in detail, utility functions are specified 
to be usual geometric ones as follows. 
 
Assumption:  
    (A9) Utility functions are constant relative risk aversion utility functions;     











           i f   γ ≠ 1 
    u(ct) = ln(ct)               i f   γ  =   1                                      ( 7 )  
where γ > 0. 
 
  (4) The timing 
  When a fundamental shock hits an economy, firstly, based on pthat is the prior subjective 
probability that the other consumers jump, each consumer calculates her prior expected utility 
conditional on p; 
   ()() p NJ E p J E , , −  
=  pE(Jtogether) +() p − 1 E(Jalone) – { pE(NJalone) +( ) p − 1 E(NJtogether)} 
  =   p{E(Jtogether) - E(NJalone)}  + ( ) p − 1  { E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether)} 
() ( ) ( ) [] () ( ) ( ) [] { } ∫ ∫
∞ − − + − + + − + + =
s t t t
t s
t t t
t dt a c u c u θ dt c u b c u θ E p ˆ ˆ 1 1
0
()() ( ) ( ) [] () () () [] { } ∫∫





t dt c u a c u θ dt c u b c u θ E p
0 1 1 1 .      ( 8 )  
Secondly, as a result of the above calculation, if ( ) ( ) 0 , , > − p NJ E p J E , then each consumer 
expects that all the other consumers will jump and thus by the assumption (A5) it is expected   14
that 1 = p . Since it is expected that  1 = p   for most of the consumers, by the assumption (A4), 
firms do not adjust capital at s and each consumer’s expected utility becomes E(J) - E(NJ) = 
E(Jtogether) - E(NJalone). On the other hand if ( ) ( ) 0 , , < − p NJ E p J E , then each consumer 
expects that all the consumers do not jump and thus by the assumption (A5) it is expected that 
0 = p  as a result. Since it is expected that 0 = p  for most of the consumers, by the 
assumption (A4), firms adjust capital at s and each consumer’s expected utility becomes E(J) - 
E(NJ) = E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether). 
 
2.3 A possibility of a deviated transition path 
    (1) A possibility of non-jump 
  First, it can be shown that if consumers are cooperative and a representative consumer 
represents all the consumers, a jump will be chosen as the optimal path. 
 
Proposition 1: If consumers are cooperative, that is, there is no possibility of Jalone and 
NJalone, the jump of consumption is the optimal path. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
    The expected utility in the case of J is higher than in the case of NJ, since, in the case of NJ, 
the extra savings accumulated by bt becomes excessive according to the new steady state 
labor-capital ratio and are not consumed or invested but simply destroyed. Hence, according to 
this result it is rational to choose J, that is, consumption jumps. 
  However, in reality consumers are non-cooperative, thus the opposite of the result may be 












0  is  examined.  
   15












0 , then E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) > 0.   
 
Proof: See Appendix: 
 
  Next, another special case of the extremely risk averse utility function is examined. Since 
utility functions are constant relative risk aversion utility functions, the new saddle path for the 






t t − ′ =
ˆ ˆ
, and thus asγ increases,  0 ˆ c decreases toc . 
 
















Proof: See Appendix: 
 
    Based on the above two Lemmas, a possibility of deviated transition path can be shown.   
 
Lemma 3: If a c > , then there is
* γ  such that if
* γ γ = then E(Jalone) = E(NJtogether), and 
if
* γ γ > then E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) > 0. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2: If a c >  and
* γ γ > then there is 
* p  such that if 
* p p <  then non-jump of 
                                                   
15 Given a Cobb-Douglas production function, the condition  a c >  will be easily met for a several % shift of 
the rate of time preference and a few decades s.   16
consumption is the optimal path. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
  This result appears amazing, because it asserts a possibility of protracted output gaps in an 
economy without any rigidity and a possibility of rational deviated transition paths. A rational 
non-jump choice means that successive deviations from equilibrium bt occur in an economy 
until time s as a result of rational choices of agents. Thus, a sluggish situation with high 
unemployment rate and huge excess in production capacity will persist long after a huge 
upward time preference shift. This newly uncovered mechanism may shed new light on the 
view of equilibrium, or disequilibrium. 
 
Proposition 3: If ∞ → s , then the jump of consumption is the optimal path. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
  This proposition highlights importance of the finite period s. If s is set to be infinite, 
non-jump deviation is not optimal anymore. It implies that the finite period s is crucial for the 
possibility of deviation.   
 
    (2) The prior probability 
  The  prior  probability  p  plays a crucial role of determining deviations. However, how prior 
probability is formed is difficult to answer. One possibility is that it is formed based on a 
behavioral model induced by analyses of the past consumers’ behaviors. Another possibility is 
that utilities have the feature of habit formation and thus pmay be small by consumers’ strong 
intention to keep consumption around the old steady state.   17
  Third possibility is that, because Jalone is much riskier than NJalone, consumers set  p 
very low to avert the risk. Because   
  E(Jalone) –E(NJalone) = 
  () ( ) () ( ) () ( ) () ( )  

 
 + + + + −  

 
 − + + + + ∫∫ ∫∫








t dt a c u θ dt c u θ E dt a c u θ dt b c u θ E
0 0 ˆ 1 1 1 1  
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t dt c u a c u θ dt c u b c u θ E ,              ( 9 )  
due to Lemma 3, then the case that a consumer mistakenly jumped since she thought the other 
consumers would jump although they in actuality did not jump is much riskier than the case 
that she mistakenly did not jump since she thought the other consumers would not jump 
although they in actuality jumped. Since consumers are risk aversive (γ > 0), then if there is no 
information about p, a consumer will bet to the less risky latter case ( 0 = p ) rather than the 
riskier former case ( 1 = p ) and thus will set pvery low. 
  If all the consumers are on the saddle path or at the steady state, the number of consumers 
who dare to deviate may be small and then  pmay be high. In this case, the best strategy of 
consumption for each consumer will be to stay on the optimal path of the representative 
consumer. However, in a situation that a fundamental shock hits an economy, consumers are 
flown out of and thus not on the optimal path of the representative consumer, it can not 
naturally be asserted that the number of consumers who try to deviate from the optimal path of 
the representative consumer is small. Because consumers are full of suspicion whether other 
consumers jump to the new saddle path or not, consumers may take a choice in the risk 
aversive manner described above, and thus may set  p very low. Hence, when a fundamental 
shock hits an economy, a possibility of non-jump can not be denied naturally.   
 
    (3) The effect of the scale of shocks   18
  A natural question may be how this possibility of deviation changes when the scale of 
shocks changes. In this sub-section this question is examined. 
 
Lemma 4: If there is
* p and













0 , the jump of consumption and the non-jump of consumption are 
indifferent.  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Lemma 5: If there is
* p and













0 , the non-jump of consumption is the optimal path.   
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
  The Lemma 5 indicates that how different it and θ are is an important determinant of the 
choice of deviation. The difference between it and θ will change according to the scale of shift. 
Since a change of the scale of shift changes streams of t c ˆ , bt, it, and a, before examining the 
effect of scale of shocks on deviation, the relation among t c ˆ , bt, it, and a, need be examined. 
Thereby how the equilibrium consumption changes according to changes of the rate of time 
preference is examined. Let  () θ c ˆ   be the consumption at steady state corresponding to each θ. 











c d  as shown in Panel (a) of Figure 3. Hence, if θ shifts upward from θ1   19
to θ2 and  0 2 1






















θ Ω d . On the other hand, the function  ( ) =




− + θ () 0 1
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θ Ξ d . 
Clearly, () 1 0 = Ξ .  
 
Assumptions:     













  This assumption is introduced to specify how the stream of deviated consumption path ct 
changes when θ* changes. The assumption, which asserts that the larger the difference 
between the old and new consumptions at steady states is, the larger the scales of bt and a for 
any period are, does not appear to be unnatural but seems reasonable.   
 
Remark: By the assumption (A10) and the features of  ( ) ()
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Lemma 6: If there is
* p and
* p p < , for any given set of streams of ct, and it, there is s* such 
that if s > s* then   
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Proof: See Appendix. 
 
    This lemma asserts that the effect of a overrides that of bt if s > s*. Here, let 
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dθ , both graphs increase as 
* θ increases but 
their marginal increases decrease as 
* θ increases.   
  In  addition,  let 
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 and 
   () ( ) () () [] ∫ ∫
∞ − ∞ −




t * dt c u a c u θ θ E dt θ θ Π Π 1 1 1 1 .        ( 1 4 )  
 
Proposition 4: If there is
* p and
* p p < , and given a shift from  1 θ  to  θ θ ˆ
1 + and given that γ 
= γ*, if  1
1
1 2 θ s > − and 
* s s >  then there isθ such that if 
* θ  < θ  then the non-jump of 
consumption is the optimal path.   
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
    Proposition 4 is important as Proposition 2. Proposition 2 asserts that for any θ* if γ is large 
then the non-jump of consumption is optimal, and Proposition 4 asserts that for any γ* if a shift   22
of time preference rate
* θ is smaller than  θ then the non-jump of consumption is optimal.
16  
 
Proposition 5: If there is
* p and
* p p < , and given a shift from  1 θ  to  θ θ ˆ
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 in case that
* θ <
# θ ˆ for some  () 0 ˆ >
# θ , 
then there isθ such that if 
* θ  < θ  then the non-jump of consumption is the optimal path, 
even though 
* s s ≤ .  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
  This proposition enlarges the proposition 4 and shows that, even though
* s s ≤ , deviated 
transition paths are possible under certain conditions. 
 
    (4) The optimal deviated transition path   
  In the previous sections, the deviated transition path is arbitrarily assumed. However, it 
should be determined by maxinization of each consumer’s expected utility. In this sub-section 
the optimal deviated transition path is examined. Let 
Ψ =  E(J) - E(NJ) = {pE(Jtogether) + (1 - p)E(Jalone)} - {pE(NJalone) + (1 – 
p)E(NJtogether)} 
  =   p{E(Jtogether) - E(NJalone)} + (1 - p) {E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether)} 
   () ( ) ( ) [] () ( ) ( ) [] { } ∫ ∫
∞ − − + − + + − + + =
s t t t
t s
t t t
t dt a c u c u θ E dt c u b c u θ E p ˆ ˆ 1 1
0
 
()() ( ) ( ) [] () () () [] { } ∫ ∫




t dt c u a c u θ E dt c u b c u θ E p 1 1 1
0
,  (15) 
                                                   
16 If a shift of time preference rate 
* θ ˆ is larger thanθ , the jump of consumption is the optimal path. This may 
imply that if people face a huge risk like a sever war in their neighborhood and thus their time preference rates go   23
where 
   () ∫∫ + =
ss
r q r t t dr dq i b i a
0 1 ln exp                                   ( 1 6 )  
and 
   () ∫∫ + =
ss
r q r dr dq i b θ a
0 1 ln exp .                                   ( 1 7 )  
If there is
* p and
* p p < , then 0 = p  and  thus 
  Ψ =  () ( ) ( ) [] () () () [] ∫ ∫




t dt c u a c u θ E dt c u b c u θ E 1 1
0
.  (18) 
  S i n c e  Ψ = E(J) - E(NJ), a consumer expects that the deviated transition path that makes 
Ψ lowest will be most attractive in case of non-jump. Based on this conjecture, “the 
unconditional optimal deviated transition path” is defined as follows. 
 
Definition: The unconditional optimal deviated transition path  t c ~ is  t c such 
that Ψ c
t c
t min arg ~ ∈ . 
 
Proposition 6: If there is
* p and
* p p < , 
   () () () a c u dq θ i E c u E
s
t q t − ′ − = ′ ∫ exp ~ , and thus 
   () () a c dq θ i E c E
γ s







exp ~ . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Corollary 1: If there is
* p and
* p p < , 
   (1)  () a c E c − > 0
~  
                                                                                                                                                   
up significantly, they will jump up consumption and consume much of their savings.   24
   (2)  () a c E c E s − = ~  







where  t s t s c c ˆ lim ~
→ = . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 7: If there is
* p and
* p p < , 
   (1)  c c s = → 0 0
~ lim  
   (2)  0 0 ˆ ~ lim c c s = ∞ →  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 8: If there is
* p and
* p p < , then  t t s c E c E ˆ ~ lim = ∞ → . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
  Hence, in case of ∞ → s , the deviated transition path  t c ~ becomes identical to the new 
saddle path t c ˆ of the representative consumer. This result seems natural because 
∞ → s means that firms will not destroy capital infinitely, which is the assumption in usually 
used models. This result, in reverse, implies importance of the finite period s, in which period 
all the agents return to the optimal paths of the representative consumer and firm.   
 
Corollary 2: If there is
* p and
* p p < , then 0 0
~ ˆ c c > . 
   25
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Corollary 3: If there is
* p and
* p p < , thens that makes 0 0
~ c c = where 0 c is the consumption 















Proof: See Appendix. 
 
  The unconditional optimal deviated transition path has no boundary condition, thereby 
0
~ c and  s c ~ do not necessarily equal 0 c , that is consumption just before a shock hits the economy, 
andc . Thus at s, consumers need to jump upwards from  a c − toc . In actuality, however, 
deviated transition paths may start from 0 c and reachc . Based on this conjecture, the following 
“conditional optimal deviated transition path” can be defined. 
 
Definition: The conditional optimal deviated transition path  t c
* ~ is  t c such 
that Ψ c
t c
t min arg ~* ∈  s.t. 0 0 ~ c c
* = , c c c s t s t = = →
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 and 
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where () ( ) t Θ c c E
t
Φ
t t − =
∂
∂ ˆ  . There is a control variable  t c  and three environmental 








∂ are functions of the control variable and/or other 
environmental parameters, the maximum principle for a Bolza type payoff function can be 























∂ are independent from the control variable and/or other environmental 















  has to be solved numerically. 
 
  (5)  Inventory 
  In the previous sections, it is assumed that unconsumed capital bt is simply destroyed. 
However, there is another possibility of bt ─that is, inventory. If unconsumed capital bt is 
temporally stored as inventories and consumed later, there will be no loss of resources. 
However, it is only possible if inventories are assumed to be productive and their marginal 
productivities are assumed more elastic. This assumption is adopted in e.g. Kydland and 
Prescott (1982, 1988) or Cooley and Hansen (1995) mainly not by its plausibility but by 
necessity of making RBC models workable. If inventories are productive it will be rational for 
firms to change some of more productive capital to less productive inventories in case they 
need to reduce capital. 
  The crucial point of this assumption is whether inventories are productive in actuality. 
Kydland and Prescott (1982) present some rationalizations of the assumption, but they may be   27
insufficient to believe the assumption a priori.
17 It seems more natural to assume that 
inventories are stored not because they are productive but mainly because they work as the 
buffer for uncertainties to smooth production. Most firms think inventories, in reverse, are 
sources of additional costs and thus pursue to develop new technologies that reduce inventories 
to the minimum requirement level. Anyway, this is not a problem of whether bt exist or not, 
but a problem of how to interpret bt ─ that is, whether bt can be interpreted as real disequilibria 
or not. 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
  There are basically two different views of output gaps. One view stresses importance of 
rigidities or frictions in one or more markets, which delay adjustments particularly of prices or 
wages. The other view is represented by the early version of real business cycle models and 
asserts that, because most of the shocks are productivity shocks, fluctuations of GDP are 
basically identical with fluctuations of potential GDP and thus estimated deviations of actual 
GDP from its trend should not be interpreted as output gaps. 
  The objective of the paper is to pursue the third completely different view such that even if 
there is no rigidity, large protracted output gaps are theoretically possible to exist. The paper 
presents a new model that when a fundamental shock that moves steady state is given, there is 
a possibility that agents do not proceed on the optimal path for the representative consumer 
during the transition to the new steady state as a result of rational calculation. The driving force 
behind this strange phenomenon is non-cooperative behavior of consumers. When a shock is 
given, consumers need to jump to the new optimal path of the representative consumer to 
restore equilibrium without loss of resources. However, if the expected probability of deviation 
                                                   
17 They assert that with large inventories, stores can economize on labor resources allocated to restocking, and 
firms, by making larger production runs, reduce equipment down-time associated with shifting from producing one 
type of goods to another.     28
of other consumers exceeds a critical point, the expected utility of a consumer who dares to 
deviate is higher than that when she does not deviate. The same calculation will be done by 
other consumers, thus all the consumers expect that their expected utilities are higher when 
they deviate than when they do not deviate. Facing these calculations of consumers, firms 
expect that most consumers will deviate and thus firms’ capital must be adjusted corresponding 
to the deviation of consumers─that is, unused excessive capital must be destroyed. As a result, 
all the consumers and firms expect that all the consumers and firms deviate from the optimal 
path of the representative consumers, and they behave based on the expectation and therefore 
in actuality they deviate. As a result, it is not guaranteed that a jump to the new optimal path of 
the representative consumer is optimal for each consumer.   
    The novelty of the paper is that it uncovered a new possibility of protracted output gaps such 
that consumers do not jump consumption and proceed on a deviated transition path, as a result 
of strategic calculation of expected utility. This new possibility has two important advantages; 
1) it is not necessary to present a micro foundation for a difficult question why price 
adjustments are far slower than quantity adjustments, and 2) it is not necessary to solely 
depend on productivity shocks as the standard real business cycle model that has well-known 
shortcomings such as the weak internal-propagation mechanism that needs large and persisting 
productivity shocks or necessity of unimaginable frequent negative productivity shocks.   29
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1. Proof of Proposition 1: 
  Since there is no possibility of Jalone and NJalone, then E(J) = E(Jtogether) and E(NJ) = 
E(NJtogether). Hence,   
E(J) - E(NJ) =  () ( ) () ( )  

 





t dt c u θ dt b c u θ E ˆ 1 1
0
  
   () ( ) () ()  
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t dt c u θ dt c u θ E 1 1
0
  
             () ( ) ( ) [] () ( ) () [] { } 0 ˆ 1 1





t dt c u c u θ dt c u b c u θ E ,   
because  t t t c b c > + and  c ct > ˆ . Therefore if consumers are cooperative, a jump of 
c o n s u m p t i o n   i s   t h e   o p t i m a l   p a t h .                                             ■ 
 
2. Proof of Lemma 1: 
  S i n c e  iq < θ (q < s) during the transition period for any possible path in the case of upward 
time preference shift, we get, for any stream of ct, it that satisfy the assumptions,     
  E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) 
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0 0 1 ln exp 1 1    32
  () () ( ) ∫∫ >  

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s dt dq i θ b θ E
0 0 1 ln exp 1 1 ,          
since  () ( ) ∫ + > +
− s
t q
t s dq i θ 1 ln exp 1  for  any  t (0 膅 t < s), due to θ > iq.            ■ 
 
3. Proof of Lemma 2: 






− − ϕ and γ > 1, 











    Here, because in any deviated path 0 > t b , then for any period t (< s),  
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c u b c u . 
On the other hand, because in any deviated path  0 > t b and 0 > a , then for any period t (> s), 
if  a c >  
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c  due  to  1 > γ . 












 and  if a c > , then   33
  E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) =   
() ( ) ( ) [] dt c u b c u θ t t t γ
t s




+ () () () [] dt c u a c u θ γ
t
s − − + ∞ →
− ∞
∫ lim 1 = - ∞ <0. ■ 
 
4. Proof of Lemma 3: 
    For any set of streams of bt and it, if γ → 0 then E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) > 0 by the lemma 
1 and if  γ γ →  then  E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) < 0 by the lemma 2. Hence, because ct, bt and 
it are continuous and u is a continuous function, there is a certain γ* where E(Jalone) - 
E(NJtogether) = 0 by the intermediate value theorem. Because ct, at and bt are monotonious 
and  u is a monotonically continuous function, and because if  γ γ → then  E(Jalone) - 
E(NJtogether) < 0, if γ > γ* .                                                ■ 
 
5. Proof of Proposition 2: 
  By the Lemma 3, if 
* γ γ > then E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) < 0 for a consumer. On the 
other hand E(Jtogether) - E(NJalone) > 0 since capital is not adjusted at s and thus the jump is 
optimal for all the consumers. Hence, for the consumer,   
  0 lim → p E(J) - E(NJ) = E(Jalone) – E(NJtogether) < 0, and 
  ∞ → p lim E(J) - E(NJ) = E(Jtogether) – E(NJalone) > 0. 
Thereby, by the intermediate value theorem, there is 
* p  such that if 
* p p =  then E(J) - 
E(NJ) = 0 and if 
* p p <  then  E(J) - E(NJ) < 0. If E(J) - E(NJ) < 0 for the consumer, then for 
all the consumers E(J) - E(NJ) < 0 and  0 = p by the assumption (A5). By the assumption (A4) 
firms adjust their capital to the new steady state level at s. All the consumers do not jump since 
E(J) - E(NJ) = E(Jalone) – E(NJtogether) < 0. Hence, if 
* γ γ > then there is 
* p  such  that if 
* p p <  then  non-jump  of  consumption  is  the  optimal  path.                         ■ 
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6. Proof of Proposition 3: 
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s dt c u a c u θ E . Hence for any () 0 > γ ,  
E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) > 0, and thus for any pand p, E(J) - E(NJ)   >   0 .             ■ 
 
7. Proof of Lemma 4: 
  S i n c e  
* p p <  then  E(J) - E(NJ) = E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) by the proposition 2. For any 
stream of bt and it,  
  E(Jalone) – E(NJtogether) 
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0 0 1 exp 1 1 ,                
since  () ( ) ∫ + = +
− s
t q
t s dq i θ 1 ln exp 1  for  any  t (0 膅 t < s), due to θ = iq. 
Thereby,  
  E(J) - E(NJ) = E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) = 0.     
  Hence, the expected utility when J is chosen is identical with that when NJ is chosen, and 
thus the jump of consumption and the non-jump of consumption are indifferent.                  ■   35
 
8. Proof of Lemma 5: 
  S i n c e   it = θ, by the lemma 4, in the case of the utility function with γ → 0, E(J) - E(NJ) = 0. 
There is no utility function with γ whose value is less than that of γ in the case of the utility 
function with γ → 0. On the other hand, since it = θ, by the Lemma 3, for the γ* where E(J) - 
E(NJ) = 0, if γ > γ* then the non-jump of consumption is the optimal path. 












0 , the non-jump of 
c o n s u m p t i o n   i s   t h e   o p t i m a l   p a t h .                                               ■ 
 
9. Proof of Lemma 6: 
  S i n c e  
* p p <  then  E(J) - E(NJ) = E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) by the proposition 2.  
Step 1. 












0 , since iq < θ (q < s) during the transition 
period for any possible path in the case of an upward time preference shift, we get, for any 
given set of streams of ct, and it, 
() ( ) ( ) []
()

































t t t γ
t
dt θ
dt c u a c u θ
E
dt θ








































































0 1 ln exp
1
1
   
(since it = θ if  s t ≥ )   36
  ()


















0 1 ln exp
1 1
1 . 
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  Because  ct, bt and iq are continuous and u is a continuous function, then by the intermediate   37
value theorem, for any set of streams of bt and it, there is 
* s  such  that  if 
* s s >  then  
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  S i n c e  ct,  bt and it, are monotonic and continuous and u is a monotonically continuous 
function, as explained in the proof of the Lemma 3, 
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decreasing function of γ. 


























0 , the ratio 
() ( ) ( ) []












dt c u a c u θ E
dt c u b c u θ E
1
1
0 is smaller than 
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0 , if 
* s s >  then  also  
                                                   















. On the other hand, since  ( ) 1 1 ln exp
1






t q I dt dq i , 




t q > = + ∫ ∫∫ 0 0 1 ln exp . Hence, if bt is constant, in the case that θ is e.g. 0.05, if s is at least 
larger than 20 years, then  s <
θ
1  and thus  ( )


















0 1 ln exp
1 1
1 will be   38
  
() ( ) ( ) []
()























dt c u a c u θ
E
dt θ








  Since there is no utility function with γ whose value is less than that of γ in the case of the 
utility function with γ → 0, for any utility function, if 
* s s >   then the above inequality holds.   
Hence, there is 
* s  such  that  if 
* s s > t h e n   b o t h   i n e q u a l i t i e s   h o l d .                  ■ 
 
10. Proof of Proposition 4: 
  S i n c e  
* p p <  then  E(J) - E(NJ) = E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) by the proposition 2. 
Step 1. 
  Because  () ∫
−
+ +
s t * dt θ θ
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negative. Considering  dt I
s
t ∫0
  is larger than s e.g. 1.2 times s, s will be much shorter than 20 years.  











dt θ θ d




























































and because if  1
1
1 2 θ s > − then while 
* s θ θ > − − 1
1








s * θ θ
 and as 
* θ  
increases form 0 to more than  1
1
1 2 θ s − − then 
() 1 1
1
1 − + +










































approaches zero when 
* θ  







 is as shown in Panel (c) of Figure 3. 
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Step 2. 








  that indicates an increase of   
() () ( ) [] ∫ − + + + =
− s
t t t
t * dt c u b c u θ θ E Λ
0 1 1








  that indicates an increase of ( ) () () [] ∫
∞ −
− − + + − =
s
t * dt c u a c u θ θ E Π 1 1  
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. Hence, if γ = γ* then  θ θ ˆ =  andΠ equals Λ
~and thus E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) 
















thus Π is larger than Λ
















 and thusΠ is smaller thanΛ
~and E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) 
> 0. Hence if γ = γ* and θ* <θ  then,  E(J) - E(NJ) = E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) < 0, therefore 
t h e   n o n - j u m p   o f   c o n s u m p t i o n   i s   t h e   o p t i m a l   p a t h .                                ■ 
 
11. Proof of Proposition 5: 
  S i n c e  





* * θ θ
θ
θ θ















 then E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) < 0,  even 
though 
* s s ≤ . Hence, there is  θ such that if 
* θ  < θ  then, 
E(J) - E(NJ) = E(Jalone) - E(NJtogether) < 0 even though 
* s s ≤ , that is, the non-jump of 
consumption is the optimal path, even though 
* s s ≤ .                             ■ 
 
12. Proof of Proposition 6: 
  Since 
* p p <  then, 
  Ψ = () ( ) ( ) [] () () () [] ∫ ∫




t dt c u a c u θ E dt c u b c u θ E 1 1
0
, and 












∞ − − 1 ln exp 1 1  





t − ′ + + + ′ + − = ∫
− − 1 ln exp 1 1 . In addition,   41




> − ′ ′  

 













since  0 < ′ ′ u . 
  Ψ has one control variable t c and environmental parameters, derivatives of which are all not 













() () () a c u dq θ i E a c u
θ
dq i
E c u E
s
t q t s
s
t q









  Hence,  if  t c ~ is  t c such that Ψ c
t c
t min arg ~ ∈ , then  () ( ) () a c u dq θ i E c u E
s
t q t − ′ − = ′ ∫ exp ~ .  
  In case of  1 ≠ γ ,  ()
γ
t t c E c u E




t q a c dq θ i E a c u dq θ i E
− − − = − ′ − ∫ ∫ exp exp . 
Thus,  () () a c dq θ i E c E
γ s







exp ~ . Similarly, it is proved in case of  1 = γ .  ■ 
 
13. Proof of Corollary 1: 
 (1)  Since, () () () a c u dq θ i E c u E
s
t q t − ′ − = ′ ∫ exp ~ , then 
  () () ( ) () a c u dq θ i E c u c u E
s
q t t − ′ − = ′ = ′ ∫ → 0 0 0 exp ~ ~ lim . 
Because  ( ) 1 exp
0 < − ∫
s
q dq θ i E due to  θ iq < , then  ( ) a c E c − > 0
~ . 
 (2)  () () ( ) a c u E c u E c u E s t s t − ′ = ′ = ′ →
~ ~ lim , since () 1 1 ln exp lim = + ∫ →
s
t q s t dq i E  and 




s t θ E . Hence,  ( ) ( ) a c E c E s − = ~ . 
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t q − ′ − − − ′ − = ∫ ∫ exp exp  
() ( ) () 0 exp > − ′ − − = ∫ a c u dq θ i i θ E
s
t q t since,   0 > − t i θ . 






t                                 ■ 
 
14. Proof of Proposition 7: 
 (1)  () ( ) () a c u dq θ i E c u
s
q s s − ′ − = ′ ∫ → → 0 0 0 0 exp lim ~ lim  




q s ′ =  

 
 + − ′ − = ∫∫ ∫ → 0 0 0 1 ln exp exp lim . 
Therefore  c c s = → 0 0
~ lim . 
  (2) In case of 1 ≠ γ , 








∞ → ∞ → − − = = ′ ∫0 0 0 exp lim ~ lim ~ lim  
() () ()
γ ss
r q r r
s
q s dr dq i c c θ c dq θ i E
−
∞ →  

 
 + − − − = ∫∫ ∫ 0 0 1 ln exp ~ ˆ exp lim . 
Thus, 
() () ( ) 0 ~ exp lim 1 ln exp ~ ˆ lim 0
1
0 0 =  

 
 − =  

 




r q r r s , 
since () 0 exp lim
0 = − ∫ ∞ →
s
q s dq θ i E  due  to () θ k f E i E t t t t = ′ = ∞ → ∞ → lim lim . 
Hence, () ( ) ∫∫ + − = ∞ →
ss
r q r r s dr dq i c c θ E c E
0 1 ln exp ~ ˆ lim . Since ( ) ∞ = + ∫ ∞ →
s
q s dq i







t by the Corollary 1, then 
if () 0 ~ ˆ lim 0 0 > − ∞ → c c E s ,  () ( ) ∞ = + − = ∫∫ ∞ →
ss
r q r r s dr dq i c c θ c E
0 1 ln exp ~ ˆ lim , and 
if ( ) 0 ~ ˆ lim 0 0 < − ∞ → c c E s ,  () ( ) −∞ = + − = ∫∫ ∞ →
ss
r q r r s dr dq i c c θ c E
0 1 ln exp ~ ˆ lim . This   43
contradicts  ∞ < < c E 0  because  c E is the new steady state consumption. Hence, 
( ) 0 ~ ˆ lim 0 0 = − ∞ → c c E s and thus  0 0 ˆ ~ lim c c s = ∞ → .  
    Similarly, it is proved in case of  1 = γ                                 ■ 
  
15. Proof of Proposition 8: 
    It is shown in the proof of the Proposition 7 that in case of 1 ≠ γ , 
() ( ) ∫∫ + − = ∞ →
ss
r q r r s dr dq i c c θ E c E
0 1 ln exp ~ ˆ lim . Since for any period k (< ∞) 
( ) ∞ = + ∫ ∞ →
s






t by the Corollary 1, then 




r q r r s dr dq i c c θ c E 1 ln exp ~ ˆ lim , and 




r q r r s dr dq i c c θ c E 1 ln exp ~ ˆ lim . This 
contradicts  ∞ < < c E 0  because  c E is the new steady state consumption. Hence, for any 
period k (< ∞)  ( ) 0 ~ ˆ lim = − ∞ → k k s c c E and thus ( ) ( ) t t s c E c E ˆ ~ lim = ∞ → .  
    Similarly, it is proved in case of  1 = γ .                                 ■ 
 
16. Proof of Corollary 2: 
    By the proposition 6,  () ( ) () a c u dq θ i E c u
s
q − ′ − = ′ ∫0 0 exp ~ . 
() () ()
ds













() ( ) () 0 exp
0 < − ′ − − = ∫ a c u dq θ i θ i E
s





c d . 
  Here, suppose that there is 
# s  such as  0 0
~ ˆ c c < if 
# s s = , then in case of 
# s s > there   44









c d  that is proved above. Hence, there is not 
# s  such as  0 0
~ ˆ c c < if 
# s s = , and thus  0 0
~ ˆ c c > .                                             ■ 
  
17. Proof of Corollary 3: 
    By the proposition 6,  () ( ) () a c u dq θ i E c u
s
q − ′ − = ′ ∫ 0 0 exp ~ . In case of  1 ≠ γ ,  
() () ( ) ()
γ s
q
γ a c dq θ i E c c u c u
− − − − = = ′ = ′ ∫0 0 0 0 exp ~ . Thus 
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A deviated transition path 
0 =
dt
dct in the 
case of the old θ 
 Figure  1  
New Saddle Path  Old Saddle Path
0   46
Figure 2 
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The path of NJalone 
a c +  
The path of Jalone 
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